Publication Date: 6/1/74     Pages: 3     Date Entered: 1/5/93     Title: Specially Designed Vehicle with Armed Guards for Road Shipment of Special Nuclear Material     June 1974     U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION     REGULATORY GUIDE     DIRECTORATE OF REGULATORY STANDARDS     REGULATORY GUIDE 5.31     SPECIALLY DESIGNED VEHICLE WITH ARMED GUARDS FOR     ROAD SHIPMENT OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL A. INTRODUCTION     Paragraph 73.31(c) of 10 CFR Part 73, "Physical Protection of     Plants and Materials," requires that road movements of special nuclear     material (SNM) in quantities identified in Section 73.1(b)(2) be     protected by one of the following methods: (1) shipment with at least     two armed guards accompaning the shipment in a separate escort vehicle     or (2) shipment in a specially designed truck or trailer which reduces     the vulnerability to diversion by design features that permit     immobilization of the van and provide barriers or deterrents to physical     penetration of the cargo compartment. If armed guards are used with the     specially designed vehicle, immobilization is not required. Paragraph     73.30(d) requires that the qualification of individuals to act as guards     used pursuant to Section 73.31(c) be documented. This guide describes     features acceptable to the Regulatory staff for a vehicle operated by     armed guards to ship special nuclear material by road and for the     qualification of the armed guards. B. DISCUSSION     There are two approaches that can be taken to satisfy Section     73.31(c)(2), i.e., specially designed truck or trailer. One method would     be the use of a specially designed secure cargo vehicle that is     constructed so as to resist entry for a substantial period of time by     unauthorized personnel using a wide variety of tools and weapons. The     penetration time would be commensurate with the time needed for law     enforcement agencies to respond to the scene of an emergency. The     vehicle would be designed to be immobilized upon command in case of a     diversion attempt.     The other method would be through the use of armored car service.     In this case resistance to unauthorized entry is provided, in part, by     the armed personnel within the vehicle who are in turn protected by the     inherent design of the armored vehicle.     Acceptable characteristics of vehicles and personnel used in     armored car service are provided in this guide. 1. ARMOR     Armored vehicles are supplied to the industry by a very small     number of manufacturers. The specific design of the armor supplied by     each company is considered proprietary information. The armor can     generally be described with respect to its resistance to projectile     penetration. All manufacturers provide armor which will resist initial     penetration by bullets from readily available small arms. The armor is     usually affixed to the vehicle in such a way as to provide protection to     the occupants against attack from any external direction. 2. CAB-CARGO INTERFACE     The cab-cargo interface can be provided with several options. In     most cases the separating wall between cab and cargo compartment is     armored to provide protection in case either compartment is compromised.     A window of bullet-resistant material which allows the crew in one     compartment to have a clear view of the access doors of the other     compartment is also provided. Some models have a door that allows     passage from the cab to the cargo compartment without leaving the     vehicle. Other models are equipped with gunports that permit firing     from cab to cargo compartment. 3. GUARDS AND DRIVERS     Normally an armored vehicle crew consists of two or three     individuals divided between the cab and cargo compartments. For     long-distance trips the crew is often increased to allow rest periods     for drivers and guards. SNM shipments are expected to involve frequent     long-distance trips of two or more days. In order to maintain the full     protective capacity of the armored service during these trips, it is     important that adequate crews for continuous manning of both     compartments during normal operation be supplied. Considerable     flexibility in achieving this end would be provided if both guards and     drivers were qualified and permitted to perform either function (guard     or driver). 4. DOOR LOCKS     All armored vehicles are supplied with compartment locks for both     the cab and cargo doors. In many cases access to the cargo compartment     requires positive action by personnel in both compartments when the     cargo compartment is occupied by a guard. 5. ALARM SYSTEM     Many of the armored cars presently in service are equipped with     audible alarms and/or flashing lights similar to those used by police     and emergency vehicles. The awareness of attack that such alarms elicit     in the general public can facilitate response to attack or recovery of     diverted material. 6. SECURING OF CARGO     Armored cars have no standard provision for tying down cargo.     This is understandable in view of the types of cargo normally handled by     these carriers. For SNM cartage, where larger and heavier cargos can be     expected, some provision for adequate tie-down restraint will be     required to provide for cargo integrity and personnel safety. It is     expected that only minor effort and expense would be required to equip     existing vehicles with tie-down fittings. 7. RADIATION MEASUREMENTS     Each shipment will be configured at origin to be in compliance     with Department of Transportation (DOT) general packaging and safety     requirements (DOT regulation 49 CFR 173.393). Additionally, in order to     monitor total radiation absorbed by personnel, some type of personnel     dosimetry should be considered. Types of personnel dosimeters are the     film badge and pocket dosimeter for gamma radiation, and the     thermoluminescent neutron dosimeter (TLD) for neutron radiation. The     film badge consists of a film packet in a plastic holder. The film     badge or TLD provide an accurate indication of exposure to radiation     over a long period of time. Since the film has to be developed and read     on a densitometer, it may take some time to obtain a radiation reading.     The pocket dosimeter, on the other hand provides a quick estimate of     radiation received over a short period of time, but is not as accurate     as the film badge for gamma radiation. 8. GAS PROTECTION     Many of the newer armored vehicles use a flow-through     (front-to-back) air system for heating and cooling the vehicle interior.     Typically, these systems draw outside air from the front (cab area) of     the vehicle and expel exhaust air through vents in the upper areas of     the vehicle. A slight positive internal pressure provided by the air     system offers some resistance to the introduction of gaseous substances.     The air intake is under occupant control and can be closed. Some     vehicles are normally equipped with gas masks. The use of gas masks,     filters, and internal air supplies for carriers of SNM would enhance the     ability of vehicle crew members to resist gas attacks. 9. ANTENNA PROTECTION     Almost all armored vehicles are equipped with communication     systems of some kind. Each vehicle is equipped by the purchaser of the     vehicle although the manufacturer may provide mounting structures or     access areas for the communication system components. In some     instances, the purchaser may provide the communication equipment to the     manufacturer who will install the equipment at the time the vehicle is     constructed. Both radio and radiotelephone systems are in use. Each     system is dependent on the use of radio signals received and transmitted     from a vehicle-mounted antenna which could logically become the first     target of an attack. Loss of an antenna during attack would preclude     the vehicle occupants from either notifying external agents of the     attack or from seeking aid or assistance. To provide for sufficient     delay during an attack for a vehicle crew to transmit emergency     messages, antenna protection is desirable. Such protection could be     provided in the form of concealment, multiplicity, or hardening. The     actual antenna could be concealed or designed to appear as some other     object while conventionally appearing dummy antennas would be     conspicuously located on the vehicle. Multiple antennas using internal     switching could offer a delay sufficient to enable emergency messages to     be transmitted. Hardened, attack-resistant antennas could be designed     and used to provide a delay time. Combinations of these or other similar     methods could enhance the viability of transmission. C. REGULATORY POSITION     The characteristics listed below are acceptable to the Regulatory     staff for a road vehicle operated by armed guards in order to comply     with AEC regulations pertaining to SNM shipments. Additional Federal,     State, and local requirements pertaining to safe interstate and local     transport of cargo may also pertain to such shipments and compliance     with these requirements is expected. 1. ARMOR     The vehicle should provide protection for the driver(s) and     guard(s) against projectile impact. The external surface of the vehicle     (side panels, floor, top, firewall area, and viewing areas) should be     constructed of materials which are resistant to at least the muzzle     impact energy of a .357 magnum bullet. The fuel tank(s) should also be     provided with similar protection against projectile impact. The fuel     tank(s) should be equipped with a lock-type cap and a screen in the tank     nozzle to prevent the insertion of an explosive device into the tank. 2. CAB-CARGO INTERFACE     The wall separating the cab and cargo compartments should be     armored. Additional features to be considered in the detailed     construction of the cab-cargo interface depend on the method selected     for the protection of the shipment. At least one of the methods listed     below should be used. These methods are similar in that each provides     the capability for the crew to use firearms to prevent entry into the     cargo compartment without leaving the vehicle.     a. An armed guard should be permanently stationed in the cargo     compartment. In this case, a continuous wall of armor with a     bullet-resistant window would be considered adequate as a cab-cargo     interface.     b. Access to the cargo compartment from the cab should be     available so that a guard can go directly from the cab to the cargo     compartment without leaving the vehicle.     c. Gunports should be available which will permit firing from     the cab into the cargo compartment. Additionally, the gunports should     permit firing of the weapon at wide angles so that overt entry from all     sides of the cargo compartment can be prevented. 3. GUARDS AND DRIVERS     All personnel of an armored vehicle should be qualified to perform     all normal operational tasks involved with a shipment. Both guards and     drivers should be qualified to perform either function, and interchange     of function should be allowed if required for the safety and security of     the cargo and crew.     Compliance with DOT regulation 49 CFR 173.393(j)(4) which deals     with radiation levels in occupied vehicles, should be maintained in     addition to other applicable State and local requirements. All guards     and drivers should be qualified in accordance with AEC Regulatory Guide     5.20, "Training, Equipping, and Qualifying of Guards and Watchman," or     an equivalent program. 4. DOOR LOCKS     The cargo compartment doors should normally be in a locked mode     and should be secured by a locking mechanism requiring positive action     by personnel in both the cargo and cab compartments for operation if the     cargo compartment is occupied. If the cargo compartment is not     occupied, the cargo compartment door lock should latch closed when shut,     and should also be further secured by a padlock. Opening of the cargo     compartment door lock should require positive action by personnel at the     cargo compartment door and in the cab compartment. The cab compartment     doors also should normally be locked and should require key insertion     for operation from the outside. 5. ALARM SYSTEM     The vehicle should be equipped with an audible and/or visual alarm     which is activated from within the vehicle and which has the same range     of detection as that normally required by emergency vehicles.     Deactivation of the alarm system circuitry should require access to the     armored compartments of the vehicle. 6. SECURING THE CARGO     The vehicle should be supplied with fittings in the cargo     compartment to provide an adequate attachment for such securing devices     as are required to provide restraint against substantial movement of or     damage to the cargo in normal operation and during emergency stops. The     cargo must be secured as required by 49 CFR Part 177. 7. RADIATION MEASUREMENTS     Personnel involved in the handling of radioactive material should     be provided with a film badge, a pocket dosimeter and for plutonium     shipments, a thermoluminescent neutron dosimeter. These should be     monitored after each trip. 8. GAS PROTECTION     The vehicle compartments should be equipped with gas masks,     filters, or an internal air supply to permit the crew to resist an     attack by incapacitating gas for a sufficient time to allow transmittal     of a distress message and, if possible, the arrival of aid. 9. ANTENNA PROTECTION     Either a concealed or a hardened antenna should be provided in     order to afford sufficient time for the communication system to transmit     an emergency message. 10. IMMOBILIZATION     Although there is no requirement for immobilization of vehicles     which use armed guards, this is a desirable feature. The vehicle could     have a provision for immobilization upon an authorized command     originating from within the vehicle. Once commanded, the immobilization     system should resist unauthorized deactivation for as long as feasible.     Caution should be taken to assure that activation devices which cause     immobilization are adequately shielded to prevent them from being     energized from spurious electromagnetic signals.     26